# A Single Firm Produces Widgets With A Cost Function And Inverse Demand Function As F 2649750

1. A single firm produces widgets, with a cost function and inverse demand function as follows, C(q) = 150 + 2q P(Qd) = 10 0.08Qd (a) Calculate the monopolists profit-maximizing price, quantity, and profit if he can charge a single price in the market (single price monopolist). (b) Suppose the firm can sell units after your answer to (a) at a lower price (2nd-degree price discrimination, timed-release). What quantity will be sold for what price in this second-tier market? Calculate the monopolists profit. (c) Suppose each new tier of pricing the monopolist introduces increases fixed costs by \$2 (quantities can be irrational). What is the profit-maximizing quantity, number of prices, monopolists profit, and deadweight loss? (d) Suppose the firm can perfectly price discriminate (1st-degree) with a 40% increase in marginal cost; calculate the profit-maximizing quantity, monopolists profit, and deadweight loss? (e) Between (c) and (d), which is socially preferred? Which would the monopolist choose to do? 2. The car manufacturer Edison is the sole producer of electric cars in the market, selling to two different types of customers. All else equal, travelers (type t) prefer batteries that go longer distances between charges and are willing to pay for this luxury. Urban drivers (type u) do not require as great a battery. Edison knows the willingness-to-pay of each type, and that there are q percent of type ts in the market. The willingness-to-pay for each type for different battery sizes are, Vt(k = 100) = \$160, 000, Vt(k = 60) = \$80, 000, Vu(k = 100) = \$100, 000, Vu(k = 60) = \$60, 000, where k is the battery life in kilowatt hours (kWh). Producing 60 kWh battery costs \$30,000, which is half the cost of a 100 kWh battery. (a) Edison showroom salesmen believe they can perfectly identify (1st/3rd-degree) which type of buyer walks through the door. Find the profit-maximizing prices (pi) and battery sizes (ki). What is Edisons average profit per customer? (b) It turns out Edison salesmen are not as smart as they think, and cannot identify any type of customer. If Edison offered the packages in (a), demonstrate who would buy which type? (c) If Edison has no way of price discriminating, what should they do? Consider all possible options for different values of q. (d) Sensing a better option, Edison hires some economists to help. Write out the participation/rationality constraints and the self-selection/incentive compatibility constraints. Which ones hold with equality? (e) Determine the profit-maximizing pricing strategy for Edison for any distribution of buyers (meaning for all values of q). Attachments: PS3-3-.pdf